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The Comintern’s Third Period, 1928-1934, based on Stalin’s ‘second revolution’ in Russia, capitalist 
crisis and the claim that social democracy and fascism were twins, generated sectarian, ultra-left 
politics which proved inimical to Communist activity in trade unions.  This article sheds new light on 
that issue by revisiting three connected episodes:  the British party’s (CPGB) renewed turn to the 
unions, heralded in the January resolution of 1932; the roles  Comintern staff and CPGB leader Harry 
Pollitt, played in this initiative; and the subsequent attempt by Pollitt to revise the politics of union 
work.  This triptych reviews both primary sources and the recent historiography.  It argues that some 
accounts have overestimated the novelty of the January resolution, blurred its meaning, and 
exaggerated Pollitt’s part in it.  The resolution did not attempt to change the line but its application. 
Its impact was limited. Subsequent bids to go beyond it were muddled and unsuccessful.  The 1933 
move towards the united front, and the ensuing turn to the  popular front, possessed more profound 
significance in the creation of an effective Communist presence in trade unions than the events of 
1931- 1932. 
 
‘Between 1929 and 1931’, the official history of the CPGB records, ‘the party’s former base in the 
trade union movement faded away’.1  Academic historians concur:  ‘By 1932 the Minority 
Movement’s membership had dropped to a mere 700, the total number of Communist trade 
unionists had dwindled to a mere 1,300.  The surviving Communist nucleus was demoralized by the 
exodus’.2  In this, as in other fields of activity, ‘the CPGB relapsed into impotence’.3  The ‘Class 
against Class’ politics of the Comintern’s ultra-left Third Period constituted a major contributory 
factor.  Launched at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928, and elaborated at the Tenth 
Plenum of the executive (ECCI) in July 1929, ‘the new line’ only changed in substantive terms with 
moves back towards the united front after March 1933 – in the shadow of Hitler’s appointment as 
German Chancellor.  The trajectory of Stalinization in the USSR and the impact of global politics – 
particularly events in Germany and the anti-Soviet stance of the Social Democrats – on Russian 
interests ensured Third Period politics tacked this way or that;  different aspects of a core repertoire 
were accentuated at different times. 
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 The insurgent discourse of 1929 gave way to greater caution in 1930 as Stalin put the brakes 
on collectivization and the crisis in Germany deepened.  Stress on ‘the right danger’ was superseded 
by Stalin’s ‘struggle on two fronts’ – against ‘right opportunism’, which conciliated social democracy  
and ‘left sectarianism’, which  failed to distinguish between workers moving towards socialism and 
leaders embracing capitalism.  ‘Trade union legalism’ – operating constitutionally, playing by the 
bureaucrats’ rules – and ‘sectarian’ desertion of union activity were both condemned.4  The 
Comintern called for ‘concrete’ demands to replace ‘revolutionary phrase-mongering’ and 
counselled against ‘schematic creation’ of red unions.5  Class against Class, its modulations and 
nuances, produced intermittent confusion in the national sections and placed a premium on 
deciphering Moscow’s pronouncements.  Nonetheless, from 1929 the line remained within ultra-left 
parameters.  Its enduring pillars were capitalist crisis driving alleged radicalization and impending 
revolution – although phases of temporary stabilisation characterised the conjuncture.  A defining 
feature was the evolution of social democracy into social fascism.  The Labour Party’s transformation 
from antipode to twin of fascism was complemented by integration of its base, the trade union 
bureaucracy, with capital and the state.6 
 ‘Fascisisation’  vaccinated the bureaucracy against rank and file pressure; officialdom shed 
its contradictions and mutated into an apparatus for disciplining and betraying workers.  
Communists had to create an alternative leadership independent of the bureaucracy.  The new line 
rejected the pre-1928 approach of moving the union apparatus left through making officials fight – 
or replacing them.  It discarded the united front with reformist leaders and permitted only a ‘united 
front from below’ with rank and file workers.  Independent leadership demanded activity in 
workplaces and unions at local level – as well as among the radicalising unemployed and the 
unorganized – to assemble the revolutionary trade union opposition (RTUO).  Exposing the 
bureaucracy in words and deeds, stimulating and leading unofficial strikes, would enable 
Communists to win workers away from the machine and, in propitious circumstances, establish 
revolutionary unions. 
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 Mounting failure provoked attempts by the Comintern and its subordinate union 
counterpart, the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU), to correct the CPGB’s misapplication of 
the line.  Anxiety about its inability to benefit from capitalist crisis was lent urgency by the party’s 
parlous performance in the 1931 general election.  Discussions in Moscow produced a Comintern 
restatement unanimously adopted by the CPGB leadership in January 1932.7  Pioneering historians 
of the CPGB and Comintern attached limited significance to the January resolution.  Pelling referred 
to it briefly in describing contemporary changes in Communist policy.8  Carr was dismissive: ‘The 
resolution adopted by the central committee of the CPGB in January 1932, reflecting the current 
uncertainties in Moscow, was a repetition of formulas no more likely to prove effective than they 
had been in the past’.9  Their successors have accorded it greater importance.  For one historian, 
‘..the resolution closed a chapter in the party’s history…The CI was now prepared to back a move 
away from ultra-leftism in trade union work..’.10  Another mused, ‘..it marked perhaps the real 
beginnings of an effective Communist presence in this country’.11   
 Recent historiography portrays the January resolution as a turning point.  Several accounts 
represent it as indicating significant change in Third Period policy and furnish innovation with a 
British provenance.  The literature highlights the role of CPGB general secretary, Harry Pollitt, in the 
initiative.12  It suggests Pollitt and his supporters had to overcome antagonism from RILU and its 
secretary Alexander Lozovsky, as well as ultra-left intransigents in the CPGB leadership.13  Having 
secured agreement to the resolution, Pollitt, it is claimed, pushed beyond its prescriptions.  He 
sought, purportedly with Comintern support and some success, to steer activists away from Class 
against Class towards something like the more pragmatic approach to union activity which prevailed 
in the popular front period.14 
 This narrative displays differences of emphasis.  It is not without evidential support but 
susceptible at several points to exaggeration and inaccuracy.  This article re-examines key texts and 
measures them against  primary sources.  The next section explores whether the January resolution 
altered the Comintern line as it applied to Britain and is succeeded by examination of the problems 
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the resolution aimed to rectify.  This is followed by discussion of Pollitt’s role.   The fourth part of the 
paper reappraises ensuing debate in the CPGB and the extent to which it represented a project to 
transcend Third Period policy.  The article concludes with reflections on union work in the  aftermath 
of the resolution and the part it played in facilitating the building of a significant Communist base by 
the later 1930s. 
 
The January resolution: revising the new line?   
In their history of the Comintern, McDermott and Agnew note the impact of the Third Period on the 
CPGB which precipitated decline in membership to 2,555 by November 1930.  They continue: ‘The 
lesson drawn by General Secretary Pollitt was that a return to work within the unions was required, 
a return to a more practicable “united front from below.”  A change of line in this direction was in 
fact proclaimed following a bad-tempered session of the Profintern’s (RILU) Central Council in 
December 1931..’.15  (original emphasis).  In her official history of the CPGB, Branson refers to the 
British Commission convened by the Comintern in Moscow the same month and observes: ‘And, 
here, at last, Harry Pollitt was able to convince the ECCI that the attitude to the trade unions in 
Britain must be changed.  Thus, the British Party was at last enabled to begin extricating itself from 
the “independent leadership” trap as laid down at the Leeds Congress’.16  Eaden and Renton 
conclude:  ‘By January 1932, Pollitt had secured agreement from Moscow that “Class against Class” 
could be modified in respect of the need to win trade union support’.17  Fuller asserts that Pollitt 
‘..attacked the line at a meeting of the RILU Central Council in Moscow, arguing that the British party 
needed to mobilise opposition within the trade unions, not to form alternatives.  As a result of this 
the CPGB was given dispensation to adopt its own line’.18  (original emphasis). 
 I will discuss the roles of Pollitt and RILU in a subsequent section.  It is important to 
emphasise here that the comments quoted above all misunderstand the position in December 1931.  
There was no need for Pollitt to convince the Comintern to change the line so that party activists 
could work within reformist trade unions: the Comintern had been attempting to convince the CPGB 
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that its members should work within reformist unions throughout the previous two years.   Like ‘the 
united front from below’, such engagement was an integral ingredient of independent leadership 
and Class against Class.  This had been exhaustively explained to Pollitt by the ECCI and RILU.  Some 
of the literature suffers from the further misapprehension that there were two lines.  The first, 
attributed to Pollitt, demanded work inside existing unions and opposed new unions. The second 
downplayed activity in the reformist unions and favoured breakaway unions: it is ascribed to the 
RILU leader, Lozovsky, and CPGB ‘ultra-lefts’, notably Bill Rust.19  The record does not justify this 
bifurcation. Forming red unions was contingent on activity in reformist unions.  The two elements 
were fused in one line:  building independent leadership through working inside existing unions to 
muster revolutionary forces and then, in specified circumstances, establishing revolutionary unions.  
 The latter point requires amplification.  Lozovsky’s institutional interest in expanding RILU 
through large scale extension of red unions was curbed by Stalin and Comintern caution confirmed 
by Otto Kuusinen at the Fifth RILU Congress in August 1930.  There Lozovsky accepted breakaways 
should be considered only when a mass movement, intense struggle and strong Communist 
influence pertained.  The test was empirical:  application remained open to argument – but 
ultimately to a Comintern veto.  This, it should be stressed, was the position of Pollitt and the CPGB 
leadership:  the party would support the creation of red unions, the Leeds Congress of November 
1929 decided, where the left was confronted by undemocratic leaders who had forfeited majority 
support.  This stemmed from conviction that the social fascists would split unions rather than permit 
Communists to capture them.  Again, action depended on subjective, practical calculations:  Pollitt, 
for example, disagreed with Lozovsky over a new seamen’s union.  But in 1930 Pollitt himself was 
repudiated by the Comintern over the perspective of a British mineworkers’ union.  In 1931-2 he 
repeatedly registered support for the ECCI’s stance.20  
Whatever their differences in interpretation and emphasis,  all major protagonists accepted 
Moscow doctrine on establishing new unions and intensifying activity in existing unions.  The 
primary problem regarding reformist unions lay not with Comintern policy but CPGB practice.  This is 
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evident from a survey of the question in the two years preceding the January resolution.  The ECCI 
letter to the Leeds Congress instructed delegates: ‘The new line demands that Communist Parties, 
while not in the least diminishing their activity in the trade unions, initiate and develop independent 
organs of struggle embracing all the workers – the organised and particularly the unorganised – for 
the fight against the employers, as well as against the Fascist Labour Party and trade union 
bureaucracy’.21  The Congress duly noted: ‘The necessity for the independent leadership of all 
struggles in no way signifies the weakening of our work in the unions’.22  In January 1930, the ECCI 
reminded CPGB leaders that activity in the mainstream unions remained indispensable.23  In 
February 1930, the ECCI Presidium criticised British efforts in this direction:  ‘A marked tendency is 
observed by the Party to drop all work in the reformist trade unions.  This is a grave mistake’.24 
 The Comintern became more forceful.  In August 1930 Dimitri Manuilsky, who represented 
the central committee of the Russian Party, lectured CPGB delegates: 
You absolutely gave up work in the trade unions without having strengthened yourself in the 
factories.  The Comintern told you to pay attention to the factories.  And you drew the 
conclusion that you could throw up the work in the trade unions.  The Comintern told you to 
build up a Minority Movement in the factories and you interpreted that as “out of the trade 
unions”…Anyone who looks on the new line as a refusal to manoeuvre in the reformist trade 
unions or a refusal to work in them does not understand the real essence of the new line.25 
 
 On Manuilsky’s account, CPGB leaders had failed to act on ‘clear and exact directives’, 
misinterpreted the united front from below to mean non-Communist militants had to accept party 
positions and neglected to devise immediate demands based on workers’ expressed needs.  The 
Comintern accepted partial blame but the CPGB must replace excuses and apologies with results.  
He inquired:  ‘Should we change our line?  No... I am talking about rectifying these mistakes… 
 …the Anglo-American Secretariat has made accusing speeches against the 
 English Communist Party.  They have repeated hundreds of times that the  
 English Communist Party does not know how to work…the English comrades 
 should clearly consider…the mobilisation of the masses on the basis of their 
 immediate needs by an extensive adoption of the tactic of the united front from below, by 
 stubborn work in the trade unions, by the formation of a Minority Movement 
 which is broader than the Party.26 
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 The resolution which came out of this meeting of the ECCI Political Secretariat was 
emphatic:  the problems lay not with the line or the conjuncture but with the CPGB’s failure to 
implement the line in favourable circumstances: 
  
 In practice the new line was frequently interpreted as the abandonment of the  
tactics of the united front from below…The independent leadership of economic 
struggles was very often taken to mean the abandonment of persistent organised 
work in the reformist trade unions…the Minority Movement must make a real  
turn towards systematic work in the reformist trade unions and must form a mass  
revolutionary opposition inside and outside the reformist unions…The MM must 
try to win elected positions in the local unions…27  
 
 The British Commission convened in December 1930 mandated the Workers’ Charter 
campaign which the ECCI insisted should be based on partial demands attractive to a wide 
constituency.  The Comintern approved basic economic demands but criticised slogans which could 
alienate workers.28  The Eleventh Plenum of the ECCI in Spring 1931 witnessed further severe 
strictures on the MM and  CPGB.  Party leaders were enjoined to use the Charter campaign to build 
the RTUO, starting with demands which flowed from dialogue with workers.29  This was repeated in 
September 1931.  Small, simple slogans centring on opposition to the employers’ offensive and ‘not 
a penny off’ wages should lie at the heart of agitation.  The ECCI noted few signs of ‘a drive of the 
Party towards the factories and trade union branches…The Party should carry through concentration 
in the factories and in the trade union branches’.30 
 Similar exhortation marked RILU pronouncements.  Its Fifth Congress in August 1930 
declared that in Britain: 
 the line of independent leadership and of class against class has been wrongly 
 interpreted as meaning the abandonment of work within the reformist unions, as 
 seen in failure to conduct a fight around our programme in the unions; the non- 
 attendance of MM members at trade union meetings; giving up of the fight for 
 posts in the trade union branches; serious neglect of the struggle against the trade 
 union bureaucrats…failure to select and popularise simple, practical, economic and 
 political demands.31 
  
 Lozovsky fostered successive initiatives to galvanise the MM, including despatching 
operatives to Britain.32  In early 1931 a RILU  commission dilated on the importance of work in the 
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conventional unions.  Lozovsky conceived the Charter campaign as a means of regenerating the MM 
and independent leadership; the RILU Open Letter of April 1931 was extensively discussed at the CC 
and formed the basis for the last Charter convention.  For a time he advocated, and Pollitt accepted, 
integration of the MM and the unemployed movement.33  If all this yielded little, it was not because 
CPGB leaders neglected Lozovsky’s directives:  they tried to realise them.  As early as March 1930, 
the Daily Worker echoed RILU statements:   
..there has been a decided falling off in the trade union work of our Party and a feeling  
that there are no further opportunities for work inside the reformist trade unions.  This false 
theory is the essence of opportunism in practice, for it means the acceptance of the Tenth 
Plenum decisions but a refusal to carry them out.  Today there is a clear understanding of 
the supreme need of the factory being the basis from which all our work should be carried 
out but a non-recognition of the necessity of also carrying the same work forward into the 
trade unions…The idea that we can no longer win workers, particularly in the branches and 
in the winning of posts…is incorrect.34    
 
RILU policy was expounded in the MM paper, The Worker, and the party press.  Pollitt 
advised ‘the necessity of studying the decision(s) of the 5th Congress of the RILU.  The leads from the 
International come from the RILU’.35  Rust counselled ‘extension of our work in the reformist trade 
unions...popularisation of the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the RILU and the Open Letter’.36  
MM leaders emphasised: ‘…the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the RILU on “The Tasks of the 
National Minority Movement” and the recent Open Letter of the RILU contain the whole of the 
policy and organisational measures which will be taken:  every MM member and MM group should 
therefore continually study and apply both these important international documents to all work’.37   
There were similar attempts to  enforce Comintern edicts.  After the August 1930 ECCI, 
Pollitt directed British leaders:  ‘What we have to do is to make a sharp turn in another direction, 
that is our trade union work…We have to take a decisive turn to bring our comrades back into the 
trade unions’.38  In the aftermath of the 1930 British Commission he reflected ‘…we have been 
isolated from all trade union activity’ and reported ‘a bulletin has been sent out to all Party bodies 
outlining the steps which must be taken to raise the agitation in trade unions’.39  On his return from 
the April 1931 ECCI Plenum, Pollitt recorded:  ‘…Manuilsky said that the Party had not realised the 
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danger of its isolation from the workers, this had manifested itself in the desertion of the trade 
union work’.40  Rust reiterated:  ‘every member must be mobilised for the carrying through of the 
policy of the CI…our inability to carry out mass activity along the lines and policy of the CI is one of 
the chief causes of the present situation’.41   
ECCI decisions were incorporated in CPGB resolutions.  Yet by autumn 1931, R. W. Robson 
was complaining, ‘our biggest weakness is in regard to trade union work…despite all leads sent out, 
despite all the work done by the leadership of the Party, there are large sections of the party 
membership which still do not appreciate the importance of the work in the Unions’.42  Idris Cox 
added:  ‘only a small proportion of members joining the Party are members of trade unions and 
when they come into the Party no interest is shown by the local Party Committees in seeing that 
they become members’.43  The following month the CPGB representative in Moscow, Robin Page 
Arnot, read a Comintern letter to the PB which stated: ‘The situation in regard to the MM was 
dangerous…the line is not being carried out at all’.44  His suggestion that ‘at the end of the discussion 
a letter should be drawn up accepting the line of the Comintern…’45 encapsulated the cycle of 
vigorous Comintern stimulus and deficient CPGB response – remedying political discourse but not 
grassroots action - that had prevailed since 1929. 
This sketch justifies several conclusions.  First, the Comintern insisted that working within 
the unions - at local level on the basis of workers’ demands and the united front from below - was 
central to Class against Class and independent leadership.  Second, this was accepted by CPGB 
leaders without exception.  Third, unremitting  pressure from Moscow ensured CPGB leaders were 
acutely aware of the gap between theory and practice and endeavoured to close it.  Fourth, they 
achieved limited success.  Fifth, the idea  that the January resolution was the result of CPGB leaders 
persuading Comintern leaders to change the line and move away from independent leadership, or 
that Moscow permitted the party to elaborate its own line, is without substance.  The perceived 
difficulty was implementing established policy; the resolution’s purpose was clarification not 
revision.  It was only the latest – albeit arguably distinctive in its codification and presentation – in a 
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long list of attempts to impel the CPGB to practise its policy.  So much is evident from the 
document’s emphatic abbreviation of this dismal history: 
THE GREATEST DEFECT OF THE PARTY’S WORK DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS IS THAT IT HAS 
NOT CARRIED ON ANY SYSTEMATIC WORK IN THE REFORMIST TRADE UNIONS.  In spite of 
international resolutions (V congress of the Red International of Labour Unions and the XI 
Plenum of the Communist International) not a single step has been taken so far to make the 
MM a really widespread revolutionary trade union opposition.46 (Capitals in original). 
 
Explaining the problem - and the January resolution’s solution 
How do we account for discontinuity between the line and its implementation?  Two 
preliminary issues require more research .  First, abandonment of union work raises questions about 
Communists’ much-remarked fidelity to trade unions.47   Second, this falling away may be magnified 
if the party’s implantation in industry before 1928 has been inflated.  Quantitative analysis is absent 
from the literature but a tentative hypothesis would hazard that, despite diffused influence, the 
CPGB’s organized base in the unions was smallscale and fragile. 48  We also need more systematic 
information about 1929-1933.  Nonetheless it is possible to outline certain factors salient to 
declining involvement. 
The issue facing the leadership was how to transform members into a collective actor 
internalising and articulating successive Comintern scripts.  Party managers were firmly committed 
to the new line. The capitalists, Pollitt explained, ‘have the full force of the Trade Union Bureaucracy 
behind them…control of the machine gave the bureaucracy the power of life and death…it is ten 
times more difficult to work in the trade unions than it used to be’.49  ‘The policy of the trade union 
leaders’, he maintained, ‘is Social Fascism’.50  Independent leadership remained  daunting and 
activists required education and direction: ‘The big difficulty was to get the comrades in the Party 
clear on how to build the revolutionary trade union opposition’.51  Unifying factory and branch 
activity was key:  ‘The comrades who attended the branches were the leaders of work in the 
workshop’.52  J.R. Campbell, once critical of Class against Class, now keenly appreciated ultra-left 
strategy.53  Willie Gallacher was another strong advocate, emphasising: 
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..the very powerful movement of the bureaucracy in the fight to disintegrate the forces of 
the working class…we could not, no matter how we spoke, over-emphasise the importance 
of breaking the power of the bureaucracy in the unions and winning the branches away from 
the support of the bureaucracy and around the support of independent struggle and 
leadership…in some of the industries we can get the support of the district committees and 
we must try to use them.54   
 
The anathema against miners’ leader, Arthur Horner for refusal to recant his reversion to the 
old line confirmed the party elite’s faith in Class against Class.  But it also suggested uncertainty 
about aspects of practice as witnessed by habitual resort to Comintern guidance and visits by Pollitt 
and Rust during 1931 to consult with the ailing Rajani Palme Dutt, the only party figure who 
possessed theoretical acumen.55  Redefining the role of the MM produced proposals from dropping 
its name to dissolving it.  Official bans and proscriptions bolstered hostility from union members who 
identified the MM with disruption, sectarianism and splitting.  An ineffectual, alternative labour 
movement in miniature, it constituted a barrier to union work. The party itself was tiny,  its 
weaknesses exacerbated by disarticulation between higher party bodies, local committees and 
industrial activists which hindered effective communication of the line and motivating members to 
apply it.56   
It would be mistaken to deduce from documents that dwelt on members’ debilities that the 
leaders always got things right.  There were vacillations, for example, over the relationship of local 
officials to the machine and whether demands should be placed on the bureaucracy – its predictable 
resistance would illustrate its reactionary nature – or whether demands would encourage illusions in 
its ability to act in workers’ interests.57  Gallacher’s lead to Communist miners in early 1931 – they 
should attend the official conference but if out-manoeuvred establish their own strike committee - 
went to the voluntaristic heart of independent leadership.58  So did some of the sloganizing - ‘Strike 
now…the Communist Party is leading you’ - and Salvation Army oratory outside factories as a 
substitute for contact with workers inside.59  
Rejecting ‘loyal opposition’, asserting unions could achieve little, diminished  affinity with 
workers who believed in trade unionism.  Exposure of social fascists generated denunciation more 
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than argument, while independent leadership challenged union democracy.  The breakaway unions, 
the United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS) and the United Clothing Workers, incarnated disloyalty 
and impaired united front activity. The line lent itself to conflicting initiatives.  It was possible for 
activists to prioritise factory agitation, union activity, working towards new unions or unemployed 
struggles – and counterpose one against the other, dissolving theoretical unity in fragmented 
practice.60  Russian exhortations to independent leadership could encourage half-hearted attitudes 
to union intervention and privilege factory and strike committees embracing non-unionists:  ‘The 
masses must be organised and led if necessary without the trade union apparatus and against it; no 
fetish must be made of the trade unions’.61  British formulations insisting on independent leadership 
‘whether inside or outside the unions is a matter of expediency’62 could legitimise abstention, ‘new 
union psychology’, and illusions that unemployed and unorganized workers were more radical.  
Campbell observed dispirited branch activity and attributed it to uncertainty about how far 
fascisisation extended.63   Confusion and failure bred frustration and disillusion. Through 1931, faults 
were formally remedied – although some argued their leaders had not done enough to correct 
misunderstandings.  But all members did not read party papers regularly.  Only 25% bought the 
Communist Review, where policy was amplified. Difficulties were exacerbated by high membership 
turnover.64  
The nub of the problem was more fundamental:  the new line was unrealistic in the 
circumstances.  Economic crisis, as contemporary Marxists noted, can produce caution and 
conservatism rather than radicalisation.65  The strike rate fell below that of the early 1920s.  
Unemployment restrained militancy, victimisation curbed activism.  By 1931 only 23% of workers 
remained members of unions which had been in sustained decline since 1921.  On one estimate, 
58% of CPGB members in London and 75% on Tyneside were unemployed, while 50% of members 
were recent recruits.66  Demoralisation, marginalisation or retreat from trade unionism intensified.  
In June 1931, only 37% of party members were in unions, compared with 53% the previous 
November.67  By mid-1931, a Comintern/RILU operative in Britain concluded: ‘Despite all resolutions 
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and decisions, we have complete confusion among our comrades, even amongst some of the leading 
Party comrades, about the line, the tasks and the form of the MM…Our opposition inside the 
reformist unions has not seriously improved’.68  
Less dogmatic strategists may have changed course.  Bound by Russian imperatives, 
Comintern leaders preferred to believe that recalcitrance was rooted in human fallibility and 
inadequate understanding.  That they opted for emphatic reiteration not replacement is evident 
from studying the January resolution.  All the components of the new line – crisis, radicalisation, 
social fascism, independent leadership, the united front from below, demands based on immediate 
needs – remained intact.  The text  exhorted the CPGB to advance along the line, not retreat to 
1928, to distinguish its policy sharply from the reformist approach, not adapt to it, to intensify 
exposure of the bureaucracy, ‘the agents of the enemy’, and transform union branches from ‘organs 
of class collaboration into organs of class struggle’.  Horner’s ‘legalism’ was brandished as a reminder 
of the pitfalls of regression to ‘the old line’.  There was no break with the established position 
regarding new unions:  the resolution proposed development of the UMS and expanded on the 
urgency of preparing  unofficial strikes.69   
The orientation to developing rank and file movements, such as the Builders’ Forward 
Movement and the Members’ Rights Movement which had emerged since 1930 outside the MM, 
was unquestionably new.  But these were oppositional, unconstitutional groups, independent of, 
and antagonistic to, the bureaucracy.  Based on union branches, intervention in them was 
considered a pathway back into union work, given the MM’s marginality.  But this was premised on 
attaining an established end:  building independent leadership and the RTUO.  Rank and file 
movements, the resolution insisted, must be led by revolutionaries.  The resolution also opened up – 
but did not decide – the fate of the MM.  It could not continue on its current basis:  the extent to 
which the new movements would replenish or supersede it as the main inspiration of the RTUO was 
left undetermined, to be resolved by future events.  The document challenged but did not liquidate 
the MM.  To conclude it did is to read history backwards. 
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Taken as a whole, the resolution can hardly be characterised as a turn away from Class 
against Class.  It is difficult to accept it represented ‘…a marked change in the party’s trade union 
line’ or that it should be interpreted ‘as a major shift to the right’.70  It was, for the most part, 
although Carr perhaps put it a little too dismissively, ‘a repetition of formulas’ disseminated since 
1929.71  As CPGB leaders, such as Gallacher and Robson remarked, there was nothing substantially 
new.  What was novel was conditionality regarding the MM and, as Pollitt stressed, warnings of 
future accounting from the Comintern leaders, Kuusinen and Igor Piatnitsky.  Unless matters 
improved within six months there would be dire consequences for the MM and the party leaders.72 
 
 
Harry Pollitt and the January resolution 
 The first more than rudimentary account of the January resolution by a historian was 
provided by Martin in 1969.  It said nothing about the Comintern or its British Commission but read 
off Pollitt’s influence in directing the CPGB towards the new unofficial movements, simply and, as we 
shall see, questionably, from Pollitt’s speech at the RILU council in Moscow.73  From the 1930s, 
Communist writing had presented the resolution as purely a British affair and an updated essay in 
anglicising the episode and constructing Pollitt’s agency in the resolution’s production came from 
John Mahon in the 1970s.  Mahon had been a leading MM activist since 1929,  worked for RILU in 
Moscow during 1932 and was fully conversant with the facts.  Disregarding them, he refurbished 
party mythology which suppressed the Russian dimension and recorded that after the 1931 election: 
‘Pollitt initiated a commission of active members to examine the practical activity of the Party 
branches and to propose what should be done….The resultant resolution of the January 1932 
Central Committee dealt in practical terms with the development of workers’ movements and Party 
building; it declared political work in the factories and trade unions to be decisive…’.74  It was left to 
Branson, writing a decade later, to re-introduce the Comintern into the story - while maintaining 
that Pollitt was the decisive influence in what, she implies, had been a protracted campaign to 
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change the Comintern line.  The dearth of supporting evidence is disabling, particularly in view of her 
insistence that after 1928 ‘…the approach of those at Comintern headquarters was far more 
authoritarian, the dealings with affiliated parties more dictatorial…’.75   
 With enhanced access to the Comintern archives, research in the 1990s and the new century 
tells us more about what happened in Moscow.  Fishman explicitly assigns Pollitt the key role: 
…he told the Commission in Moscow that the Minority Movement…had become “boxed up 
in itself”.  He then executed a brilliant tactical sleight-of-hand by pointing out that other 
‘independent organisations’ existed alongside trade unions, within which Party members 
were actually working successfully to achieve the goals of Class Against Class…He declared 
that these ‘rank and file movements’ were the embodiment of Independent Leadership, 
which could become the revolutionary trade union opposition.  The Comintern 
Commission’s report faithfully reflected Pollitt’s submission including his tactical trick.76 
 
This resumé cites neither minutes nor reports of the conclave to justify its assertion of a 
causal link between Pollitt’s ‘submission’ and the final resolution.  The only evidence presented to 
corroborate the claim consists of two sentences urging the need to build the RTUO and the necessity 
to prepare strikes.  Both these sentences are taken from Pollitt’s speech to the 12th CPGB Congress 
in November 1932.77  Neither does anything to substantiate Fishman’s account of Pollitt’s role in 
Moscow a year earlier. 
Thorpe’s reconstruction is more indirect and suggestive.  He describes an Anglo-American 
Secretariat (AAS) meeting ‘in early December’ 1931 where the single speaker referred to is the 
German, Gerhardt, who expounds the necessity of CPGB work in unions.  The narrative switches to 
the ECCI Presidium on December 29th.  Pollitt, the sole actor accorded a voice on the resolution’s 
substance, emphasises union work, rank and file movements, expanding the UMS and 
‘concentration districts’.  The author continues: ‘These ideas which were embodied in the Presidium 
resolution would be put to the CEC [CC] meeting on 17 January and implemented immediately 
thereafter’.78  In the précis of the discussion which followed we hear nothing concerning the content 
of what became the January resolution from the two Comintern leaders  mentioned, Kuusinen and 
Boris Vassiliev.  We are simply informed that they ‘backed Pollitt and made helpful suggestions’ 
while Lozovsky ‘was highly critical’.79  The implication is that Pollitt was the major protagonist. 
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The problem with this account lies less with what it includes than with what it omits.  
Scrutiny of surviving records produces a different picture.  The deliberations of the Commission 
investigating the CPGB lasted four weeks and involved multiple meetings of the AAS, the EECI 
Political Secretariat and Political Commission – and the coordination of their work with the RILU 
Plenum in late November.  Kuusinen explained procedure. The British leaders would make a ‘special 
report’ to the Political Secretariat: ‘I propose that we should attempt in the course of three or four 
meetings of the Secretariat to come to a definite result.  This result can be submitted to the Political 
Commission which in turn will refer it to the Political Secretariat’.80  At the 20 December meeting of 
the AAS – from which Thorpe selects for paraphrase only Gerhardt’s speech – Kuusinen commented:  
Comrade Pollitt has formulated the chief results of our discussions in the Secretariat so 
correctly that I believe I have nothing else to add to it.  The only thing left for us to do is to 
formulate all this in the form of a resolution and it will be the duty of the Bureau of the 
Anglo-American Secretariat, together with the representatives of the British Party here, to 
work out such a resolution within the next few days.  On the 29th of this month the question 
is to come before the Presidium of the EECI.81 
 
The meeting of the Presidium described by Thorpe was the culmination of an extended 
collective and bureaucratic process; it was designed to consider the outcome of that process.  Its 
resolution was informed by the results of a number of meetings worked up by the Comintern civil 
service.  It was not, in any authorial sense, the property of Pollitt.  The representatives of the British 
Party included – on the record of those who spoke at AAS meetings – Allan, secretary of the MM; 
Fred Douglas, representing the Young Communist League; Peter Kerrigan, Scottish organiser; Wal 
Hannington, from the Unemployed Workers Movement; Horner; Trevor Robinson, Lancashire 
organiser; and Joe Scott of the MM – as well as Peter Zinkin then working for the Comintern.82  We 
do not know the extent to which their views influenced the outcome of what Pollitt referred to as 
“the inner commission.”  We do know that his speech to the December 29 Presidium was not a 
personal statement.  He acknowledged that he was delivering the report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the British Party: ‘I will therefore endeavour to explain the main results that have come 
out of the discussions of the Commission as reflected in the resolution’.83 
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There is little here to corroborate claims that Pollitt animated the January resolution.  
Moreover, the context lends scant plausibility to the proposition.  Kuusinen stated that nothing had 
been decided in advance and that production of the resolution would entail a collaborative exercise.  
It is improbable that Pollitt rather than Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Manuilsky – who represented the 
interests of the Stalinist state, and whose leadership in these deliberations Pollitt lavishly praised – 
had the final say.84 Kuusinen’s assurance that the Comintern had not summoned the CPGB to replace 
its leaders but to deepen the project commenced in 1928, and Pollitt’s complaint that the Comintern 
held his party in contempt, evoke the balance of forces.85  The CPGB was a subordinate section 
whose leader was a Comintern appointee with a two year record of unredeemed promises and 
failure in the trade union field.  There is insufficient in the evidence or the context to require us to 
invert the established hierarchy of political power and authority and assign the leading role in events 
to Pollitt. 
It is safe to assume CPGB views found their place in the resolution, particularly with regard 
to rank and file movements.  Discussion of these bodies had taken place earlier in 1931 within the 
party leadership.  It was led by Gallacher and informed by reports of practical experiences from 
Frank Jackson, Campbell and Ernest Woolley. 86  There is no evidence the rank and file initiative was 
Pollitt’s brainchild, although he certainly favoured it.  By December 1931 the relationship of these 
movements to the MM remained contentious, and incomplete enlightenment was found in Moscow. 
This brings us to the RILU council.  Branson – highlighting the contribution of one participant, 
Pollitt – claims it witnessed ‘the main battle’ of the Commission, which was largely confined to the 
question of rank and file movements.87  The debate at the council constituted a subordinate feature 
of the Commission.  The ECCI constituted the crucial terrain.  The RILU meeting was significant, not 
for Pollitt’s speech, but for the three-hour peroration of Kuusinen.88  At issue was not just the 
question of new movements but the state of the MM.  In the record of the discussion published in 
Britain, Lozovsky rehearsed his well-known deconstruction of the CPGB’s union work and repeated 
the Comintern code on new unions.  Allan emphasised the role of rank and file movements in revival 
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but  accepted Lozovsky’s critique ‘in a true revolutionary spirit’.  Lozovsky was backed by the 
German Fritz Emmerich and Stalin’s Armenian friend, Gliraj Kostanian.89  
Following Allan, Pollitt blamed RILU.  It had, he alleged, given the impression union work did 
not matter. He conceded that had now changed and reinforced Allan’s comments on the relevance 
of rank and file movements in assembling the RTUO.  He disputed the belief, which he attributed to 
RILU, that the new movements were obstacles to renewing the MM – as well as the viability of a red 
seamen’s union, given insufficient assistance from RILU.  Kuusinen asserted that the Comintern had 
inadequately grasped the isolation of the MM and posed liquidation – if a quick campaign of 
revitalisation faltered – before concluding it deserved another chance.  In summation, Lozovsky 
reiterated RILU’s longstanding support for intervention in the reformist unions.  He cited earlier 
resolutions affirming its centrality - and CPGB failures to implement them.  He responded to Pollitt: 
‘It is you who have neglected this work’.90  
Lozovsky’s exasperation was understandable.  His view of the MM as ‘the weakest link’ in 
RILU had been impressed on CPGB leaders through 1931. Within the Comintern zeitgeist it was hard 
to justify  the MM’s sustained failure and Pollitt’s part in it.  He had personally headed the 
unsuccessful  Charter campaign and, in Spring 1931, taken over responsibility for the MM from 
Gallacher.  Lozovsky’s estimations of his British affiliate were shared in London.  When CPGB leaders 
winced at RILU criticism, J. T. Murphy wryly remarked: ‘But what if they had heard Gallacher’s 
report?’91   Gallacher had assessed the position of the MM as ‘worse than deplorable’.92  Pollitt 
evaluated his own stewardship:  ‘This arrangement has not worked out very well in practice and this 
has resulted in a breakdown of the work’.93  Lozovsky would have pondered his agent’s appraisal: 
‘…after the decision that Pollitt should be responsible for the MM we have no improvement, but a 
worsening of the situation….Pollitt dissipates his energies in all directions.  When he is in London he 
visits meetings of the MM.  He is too busy with other affairs, with the PB etc to do anything else.’94  
Partisan perhaps – but Pollitt’s shot at scapegoating RILU was more problematic. Only that spring he 
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had counselled, ‘if comrades will read carefully the RILU resolutions on the MM, they will find great 
stress is laid on the question of work inside the unions’.95  
There was, certainly, evidence of disagreements over the rank and file movements. 
Emmerich felt they duplicated the MM, were too diffuse, and lacked support.96 A RILU visitant to 
Britain, ‘MacGregor’, considered them no substitute for the MM.97  RILU had a vested interest in 
maintaining its British section and a penchant for bureaucratic bodies.  The CPGB’s more flexible 
attitude seemed the best bet.  The EECI’s winning formula – keep the central MM apparatus for now 
but employ it to strengthen the movements as a means of building the RTUO – represented a 
compromise which left a lot of practical details to be worked out.  Questions about recruiting from 
the movements into the MM, maintaining MM fractions inside the movements - or abandoning the 
MM and simply expanding the movements into a new national centre - remained unresolved by the 
January resolution and would briefly exercise the Comintern, RILU and CPGB in its aftermath.  The 
differences between Lozovsky and Kuusinen hinged on the future.  Lozovsky, who further assailed 
Pollitt at the Presidum, was pessimistic about leaders, prodigal with unfulfilled promises, finally 
delivering.  Kuusinen backed the existing party leadership as the only available agency with any 
chance of alleviating the problems to which it had contributed – there seemed little alternative. 
CPGB leaders – as distinct from members - were united behind the Comintern directives.  
Nonetheless,  historians have detected concealed hostility: ‘the unanimous passage of the January 
resolution by the CC..did not mean that ultra-leftists like Rust were reconciled to a moderation of 
the party’s line. Their acquiescence was tactical..’.98  It is claimed that, as Pollitt and Campbell set 
about implementing the resolution, ‘…the Daily Worker under Bill Rust’s editorship could not be 
relied upon to support them’.99  Moreover, ‘..Rust’s comment that they could not simply rely on the 
resolution – but would have to work out how to operate it in practice – was a scarcely-veiled hint 
that the struggle would continue’.100 These judgements are unsubstantiated and inaccurate:  on the 
evidence Rust was neither singularly ultra-left – the entire leadership purveyed ultra-left policies – 
nor hostile to the resolution; nor had he engaged in any ‘struggle’ preceding it. 
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Rust’s condemnation of Communists quitting the reformist unions dated from 1930.101 
Through 1931 he partnered Pollitt at the helm of the party and in 1932 they anchored the 
Secretariat.  Rust’s reflections on turning proposals into practice were plausibly directed at 
determining issues such as the MM’s future - in the context of the difficulties CPGB leaders had 
previously experienced in applying Comintern resolutions to British conditions.   The statement 
quoted can be construed as hinting at antagonism to applying the resolution’s prescriptions only by 
neglecting the accepted rules of interpretation.102 Here is Pollitt at the British Commission 
responding to Comintern concern about the Daily Worker:  ‘I would like to say that there is no 
comrade who has progressed so rapidly as Comrade Rust, who is so sincere in his work and activity 
and the criticism of the Daily Worker is criticism against  the Party and not any individual 
comrade’.103  
Misreading  CPGB leaders stems from artificial schema which segregate them into seasoned 
realists, Comintern sceptics with union roots, around Pollitt, Campbell, Horner and Hannington;  and 
ultra-left Comintern zealots –inappropriately packaged  together as ‘Young Turks’ – including Rust, 
Allan, George Allison, Mahon, Robson, Walter Tapsell and Zinkin.104  The insubstantiality of this 
fissure and the struggles it allegedly provoked have been demonstrated.105  Through 1930 and 1931, 
the entire leadership was loyal to the line; inevitable differences of interpretation were secondary.  
The only significant conflict flared briefly in autumn 1932.  As we will see, it ranged Rust, Campbell 
and Dutt – who is rarely assigned a faction – against Pollitt and Gallacher, supported by the ‘ultra-
lefts’ Allan and Robson. No leader challenged the January resolution:  sporadic complaints came 
from Maurice Ferguson, Jim Rushton and Wooley.  The only opposition came from the nascent 
Trotskyists of the Balham Group.106 
 
What’s My Line?  the trade union controversy of 1932 
 The months following the January resolution saw some progress.  By summer sectarianism 
persisted and there was ‘slackening off’.107  Pollitt lamented the handful of Communists attending 
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the TUC Congress and his party’s anti-union image.  He estimated that 39% of Communists were 
trade unionists; only in the engineering, mining, rail, and transport unions were there 100 members. 
A third of members were trying to implement the resolution and only 13 out of 80 leading cadres 
were active in unions. The London MM organiser, George Renshaw, reported ‘widespread and deep 
rooted opposition to work in trade unions.’108  The 12th ECCI Plenum scheduled for late August 
preceded the CPGB Congress.  As the six months the Comintern had allowed for improvement 
expired, Pollitt’s continuing disquiet sparked a controversial statement on August 20; it stimulated 
accusations of erroneous formulations which risked revision of the line.  Reiteration stiffened 
resistance. 
 Branson contributed an initial account.  She outlined Pollitt’s August article which urged 
Communists to transform unions into instruments of class struggle and Dutt’s corrective – Pollitt had 
not meant unions could be captured, only the lower organs, while the party fought for a powerful 
RTUO, not a united trade unionism.  This provoked Pollitt to justify his comments, question the logic 
of confining activity to branches and districts and register antagonism to the term ‘RTUO’, because 
of its divisive implications.  Branson cited further contributions from Rust, Mahon and the Tyneside 
district, supporting Dutt; and Allan, Gallacher, Jimmy Shields and the Scottish district agreeing with 
Pollitt.  As Congress approached, ‘Pollitt having made his point deemed it wise to strike a conciliatory 
note…”I made certain unclear formulations that might be used to distort the line of the workers’ 
independent fight.”  He had not been trying to revise the line of the Party but “the rotten 
sectarianism that is paralysing our work in the unions”’.109   
 Fishman’s version is also based on the Daily Worker.  She has Dutt championing Mahon 
against Pollitt and Campbell who were seconded by Gallacher and Shields in a contest ‘promoted’ by 
Rust. The polarised argument is about whether Communists should work in reformist unions or form 
new ones: 
 Pollitt and Campbell’s insistence that Party activity should be channelled inside trade  
unions assumed that the majority, the unorganised working class, could not be 
attracted to new revolutionary trade unions and that the “reformist” organized 
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working class constituted the only potential fighting force…In the event, Pollitt and 
Campbell scored an easy victory at the Party Congress.  They surrendered a small  
amount of ideological ground to the Young Turks without the slightest intention of  
allowing them to roll back the practical advances made by Party activists on the  
ground …Pollitt and Campbell were magnanimous in victory…110  
 
 Thorpe’s use of PB minutes took things forward.  His narrative is handicapped by inadequate 
elucidation of the controversy’s content.  Explanation is replaced by imprecise reference to ‘ultra-
left’, ‘right’, ‘Pollitt’s line’ and ‘Dutt’s line’.  This is particularly problematic as nowhere in his book 
does Thorpe discuss Third Period union strategy in any detail.  After January, he asserts, 
circumstances ‘…allowed the trade union line to be taken to the right…’.111  Pollitt, he claims, had 
Comintern support for this.  On creating new unions, the Comintern hesitated ‘…to go the whole hog 
towards Pollitt’s position…’ but generally:   
 …the line had drifted surreptitiously to the right…the CI was being coaxed along nicely  
and the party apparently submitting itself to the full implications of the January resolution. 
The plenum itself helped Pollitt’s line.  First, the main resolution stated that in Britain 
“a sharp turn must be made towards work in the reformist trade unions.”  Second, 
Piatnitsky stressed more strongly than in any previous statement of the class against 
class period that Communists “must fight against…Left tendencies as much as against 
the Right” …Pollitt had the Comintern seal of approval firmly in his pocket.112 
 
This is presented as the context to a conflict which pitted Pollitt and Gallacher against Dutt 
and Rust, with Campbell initially critical of Pollitt.  The latter, ‘emboldened by the encouragement he 
had received in Moscow said that he would “fight right up to the Congress” to ensure that his own 
line on the unions won through…Campbell stated his essential agreement with Pollitt and stressed 
that he had only demurred on issues of detail’.113  The November Congress ‘…represented a clear 
victory for Pollitt and his strategy of moving the Party further away from the extremes of class 
against class…the trade union line was confirmed…This meant red unions were redundant…’.114 
These interpretations are contentious and require clarification.  On any reading of the 
sources the main combatants were  Pollitt and Gallacher confronting Campbell, Dutt and Rust.  Ideas 
that Campbell was uninvolved (Branson), allied with Pollitt (Fishman) or left Rust ‘isolated’ by 
agreeing substantially with Pollitt (Thorpe) are mistaken.  Campbell  remained a vocal critic of 
Pollitt’s position.115  There is no convincing evidence that in early 1932 ‘the line had drifted 
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surreptitiously to the right.’  Nor was the dispute about whether activists should organise within 
reformist unions or establish red unions.  The January resolution sealed earlier settlement of these 
questions;  in summer 1932 nobody in the leadership reopened them.  The casus belli was not where 
but how, the political basis on which the work within reformist unions, which all championed, was to 
be conducted.116 
When policy demanded winning workers away from an impermeable, bourgeois apparatus, 
Pollitt’s statement, ‘we carry forward the fight inside the unions so that we can take them out of the 
hands of the present leaders to transform them into strong instruments and weapons in all our daily 
struggles’117 suggested revisionism.  Matters deteriorated when Allan pronounced TUC financial 
assistance for striking Lancashire cotton workers ‘a magnificent display of solidarity’, without 
locating it in the machinations of the bureaucracy - implying pressure worked and sowing illusions in 
reformist leaders.118 Concern was compounded when a Glasgow railwayman, Macmillan, 
approbated and extended Pollitt’s economism, asserting the Communist was in the unions, ‘…not to 
proclaim the doctrine of Karl Marx but to take his place beside his fellow workers in the everyday 
fight against wage cuts, against worsened conditions.’119 
 Pollitt had not communicated what he was trying to do to his fellow leaders, 
Campbell or Rust – according to Dutt, Pollitt had put these views to him but been talked out of them 
– and was absent in Moscow for the Plenum and then in Lancashire, supervising the party’s strike 
efforts.120  When the September PB finally afforded opportunity for enlightenment the climate was 
further clouded by Gallacher’s intemperate attacks on Dutt and Rust.  Nonetheless, Campbell and 
Rust endeavoured to calm things, hazarding that Pollitt’s preoccupation with union work had 
fathered clumsy formulations with unintended consequences:  ‘…when you wrote this article … you 
were saying to yourself there is a weak part of our policy of independent leadership, the trade union 
work is not being attended to.  I write this article to gee them up.  But when this article is published 
comrades who do not know this line read it, in their minds it is something on the lines of back to the 
old policy…’.121   
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Pollitt brushed aside the proffered olive branch and refused to concede all that was involved 
was maladroit pedagogy: 
I wrote an article on July 20 on the trade union question.  I wrote with great care 
and made every formulation as I believe the question should be formulated.  I 
understood very well at the time that it would have repercussions…subsequent 
experiences have only confirmed me in the correctness of my line.  It is necessary  
to get the masses inside the trade unions, this is the decisive factor.  I am not  
worried because Macmillan says something about Karl Marx…I do not want comrades 
to think I do not understand the seriousness of the issue…I am absolutely convinced  
that this is the only line possible in the Party.122 
 
 Together with Gallacher he argued that activists could force the bureaucracy into action and 
transform unions.  Their opponents were aware of the implications for independent leadership:  if 
Pollitt was taken at his word, ‘…this question is not only of formulation but is the question of the line 
of the Party…we have reached a decisive conflict of opinion with regard to the line, with regard to 
trade union work’.123  As Campbell put it ‘…we are altering the entire union line’.124  Conviction that 
line-change, not simply strengthening the union drive, was part of Pollitt’s purpose gained credence 
from his sustained failure to explain otherwise to the PB, particularly his close collaborators, 
Campbell, Dutt and Rust whose  records on the union campaign were impeccable.  Listing his own 
initiatives on that count since 1930, Dutt pinpointed the question:  ‘Not “for” or “against” the trade 
union drive but whether the present essential trade union drive is to be carried out on the basis of 
the old line or on the basis of the new line – this is the real issue’.125  Pollitt was exhibiting ‘a 
tendency… to revise the line of the Leeds Congress, of the International and of the RILU on the trade 
union question.  We must correct this tendency…’.126 
 The discussion continued through October.  The CPGB operated without any developed 
theory of trade unionism relying on the Comintern model of an insurgent rank and file contained by 
a bureaucracy, located in the labour aristocracy, and now inclining towards fascism.  What is to be 
Done? recently published in Britain was only partly understood.127  The debates of 1932 reveal 
neither creative reference to Marxist texts, nor cogent understanding of trade unions.  What was on 
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offer was a choice between Pollitt and Gallacher’s economistic impulses and Dutt and Campbell’s 
fidelity to the line. 
 The former duo  groped towards appreciating unions as contradictory organisations and the 
relative responsiveness of their leaders, citing the Lancashire strike, the Members’ Rights Movement 
and the vote at the TUC – in these cases pressure had paid off.  Their opponents dismissed such 
incidents as transparent manoeuvres mounted to co-opt militancy and maintain legitimacy in the 
interests of capital.  Gallacher’s Pauline discovery that the bureaucracy was the same as 20 or 30 
years earlier was countered by Campbell’s invocations of social fascism, a phenomenon Pollitt 
unsurprisingly proved unwilling to address – although Gallacher protested that union leaders’ 
integration into the state remained incomplete.  Neither expanded on penetrating the higher 
echelons of unions. Reading from a Comintern document which echoed one of Pollitt’s formulations 
was countered by quotation from the last CPGB Congress at Leeds.  A recurring theme was Pollitt’s 
insistence that the union crusade was paramount and the perplexed reply that nobody around the 
table disagreed.  Proceeding in circles, the discussion underlined the political limitations of the 
CPGB.  Campbell remarked the disregard for ideas:  ‘theoretician has become an expression of 
contempt.’128    
      The affair remains hard to assess:  a stratagem of Pollitt, a gambit to maximise 
intervention in the unions, an improvised bid to revise the line – or both?  There is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that he employed a calculated ruse.  We cannot deduce absence of intention 
to change the line from his subsequent denial under fire – although scholars should also eschew 
teleology which transports the Pollitt of the popular front line back to 1932.129  His problem was 
generating activity in unions.  Experience had taught him the ultra-left line was inimical to that.  
‘Take the unions out of the hands of their leaders’ appeared a  superior mobilising slogan to ‘unions 
are becoming part of the state and can achieve little for workers.’  His dilemma was that variations 
on the latter theme had failed; but the former, he knew, unless he grossly misunderstood the 
Comintern position,  to be politically unacceptable and divisive.130  Historians do not have access to 
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Pollitt’s private thoughts. On the facts we have, what occurred was an attempt to float partial 
revision of strategy or suppress articulation of the politics of union work – which amounted to the 
same thing.  Pollitt received support, but far from overwhelming approval, in the pre-Congress 
discussion; and criticism, particularly trenchant from ‘George Pennington’ and Mahon.131  Had he 
persisted, Comintern correction seemed inevitable.  Perhaps these factors provoked the 
dénouement. 
 Contrary to some accounts, Pollitt climbed down.  In November he accepted what had been  
offered earlier:  ‘…wrong interpretations of the articles show that I did not carefully enough 
formulate some parts so as to strongly guard against any attempts to make Right distortions of our 
revolutionary trade union policy... Comrade Macmillan placed an entirely wrong interpretation upon 
my drive and I was in error in not strongly combatting this’.132   He claimed – against the grain of the 
evidence – he had had no intention of revising the line.  He wanted a strong RTUO and he had 
criticised the nomenclature only because it evoked opposition to trade unionism per se.  The draft 
Congress resolutions which reflected his arguments were amended.  Dutt informed Pollitt:  ‘I was 
very glad to see the considerable change-over from the first draft to the second, as of both from the 
formulation of the articles’.133  A few days later he wrote:  ‘…the official line is now fully corrected 
and has abandoned all the formulations criticised’.134   
Retreat was in train as Pollitt again embarked for Moscow in mid-October.  From there he 
telegraphed, opposing publication of a further intervention from Dutt.135  The PB assumed this 
implied Comintern authorisation.  Shields, the Comintern representative, had already disparaged 
Dutt which some saw as contrived endorsement of Pollitt.  But Dutt’s conclusion was judicious:  the 
Comintern might sacrifice Dutt, but not the line. That this was brought home to Pollitt, and that he 
received no encouragement  in Moscow, is lent plausibility by his mea culpa when he returned.  
Harmony was restored to a leadership Gallacher had described as ‘shattered.’136  The line remained 
unchanged. The Congress decisions, fully in accord with the January resolution, envisaged sectional 
rank and file movements and MM groups working towards developing a replacement national 
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centre, agitation in union branches, and securing posts as stewards, branch officials and conference 
delegates to build independent leadership manifested in a qualitatively more powerful RTUO.  Pollitt 
declared war on ‘trade union legalism’ and members ‘choked up with constitutionalism.’  He 
criticised those ‘who say that nothing can be done in the unions [and] the right who believe that the 
union apparatus can do everything and that the leaders can be made to fight.’  He commended the 
UMS and stressed the need to develop it.137 
 This was far from the ‘clear’ or ‘easy victory’ in shifting the CPGB  from Class against Class 
certain historians have awarded Pollitt.  Even Branson’s summation – having made his point he 
opted for conciliation – glosses over what his point was and whether he had made it, what he 
accomplished and at what cost.  Even if we accept line-change was a ploy and Pollitt’s real purpose 
was concentrating minds on union activity to a greater degree than would otherwise have prevailed, 
there is little evidence of its attainment.  That his individualist, pre-emptive approach and disdain for 
collective leadership was dysfunctional was affirmed as the discussion took on its own momentum, 
raised revision of Comintern policy and divided a leadership united since 1929. 
 It seems an expensive way to make a point.  During the debate, an article by T. H. James was 
headlined: ‘To refuse to work in the unions is desertion.  Go back to the workers and expose the 
bureaucrats within the unions.’138  Suitably expanded, this appears a more straightforward and 
fruitful way to begin to develop the argument.   Pollitt does not come out of things particularly well.  
Reflecting on the unconstructive unfolding of the controversy, Rust remarked:  ‘I think Pollitt has a 
responsibility for this…if Pollitt had not had such immediate personal reactions to the criticism of 
Dutt, if he had viewed the situation from the standpoint of the entire party and we had had an 
opportunity in the Secretariat to discuss his article before it was published, I am sure that such an 
article would not have been written.’139  
 Pollitt’s behaviour might be more understandable had he possessed Comintern backing.  
This claim does not stand up.  The comments quoted by Thorpe from the Plenum  simply 
underscored the necessity of union activity and avoiding ‘left’ as well as ‘right’ errors -statements 
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made as strongly on other occasions since 1929.  They represented no development on the January 
resolution.  They provide no warrant for suggesting that Moscow, ‘coaxed along’ by Pollitt, 
supported his initiative.  The documents Thorpe cites shed no greater light on the matter but other 
materials suggest Comintern approval was an issue within the CPGB leadership.140  
 On October 4, Robson reported on the Comintern plenary which he had attended with 
Pollitt, intimating  that the line had moved towards applying pressure on reformist leaders.  This was 
challenged at the PB by Rust – the line of the Plenum with regard to trade union work remained 
unchanged – and Tapsell:  ‘the discussion centred around how to conduct communist work, how to 
try and mobilise the workers…This does not make any change in the line…on the contrary the line 
which was laid down in various plenums is being challenged now.’141 Rust stated he had requested 
Robson rewrite his article on the Plenum.  However, Pollitt felt it should appear uncorrected in the 
Daily Worker, for the Comintern meeting had indeed amended the line – an exchange Pollitt 
denied.142  The published article gives little indication the line had been revised.  Nor do later reports 
in the party press.  The relevant Congress documents disclose nothing that could be construed as 
altering the status quo.143  Whether Pollitt, who left the Plenum after ‘a day or two’, misread the 
runes or was misled by Robson remain matters of conjecture.  All available evidence confirms Dutt’s 
verdict:  ‘The trade union drive is essential and all-important.  The Twelfth Plenum has emphasised 
this. But the Twelfth Plenum does not say there is to be a revision of the trade union line, as laid 
down in previous congresses’.144   
 
June in January:  laying the foundations of the future? 
  
 This paper has argued that the January resolution, composed by the Comintern Commission 
and validated by the EECI, cannot be isolated from earlier history; nor should its significance be 
overestimated.  Its animateurs, we have demonstrated, were Russian not British.  Pollitt’s part in it 
has been magnified.  The text represented a turn within the Third Period, an essay in revitalisation 
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not liquidation.  The sources disclose no opposition from CPGB leaders but confirm there were 
subsequent attempts to go beyond the resolution.  Confused and short-lived, they did not survive 
resistance, culminated in retreat and exercised little discernable impact on union work.  The 
resolution, and the party congress decisions based on it, framed the immediate future.  However, 
the harbinger of change came, not in January 1932, but in March 1933 which witnessed the first 
moves towards the  united front, a process which broadened before and beyond the 1935 
Comintern Congress.145 
 Finally, the agency of the resolution in inaugurating an effective Communism in Britain – or 
more pertinently in British trade unions – can be exaggerated.  By 1939, the CPGB had assembled a 
small but meaningful presence;  but on the basis of very different policies from those advocated in 
the January resolution.  The latter enabled progress by crystallising earlier exhortation that 
Communists become union activists.  Subsequent success had more to do with developments after 
1934 than with what happened at the turn of 1931.  Supervening events exercised their own specific 
influence.  There was no seamless evolution from the January resolution to what its authors would 
have branded the heretical reformism of the popular front. 
 The point is reinforced by the resolution’s aftermath.  The style of union work was more 
measured.  It remained based on the same politics – albeit adumbrated in less frenzied fashion.  
Recovery remained sluggish.  The rank and file movements on the buses and railways provided the 
first shoots of influence in the transport workers and rail unions.  Elsewhere – in tinplate, textiles, 
ports and print – such movements were marginal.  With the exception of aircraft, they never 
blossomed in engineering or the electrical industries, although a burgeoning Communist presence 
on district committees facilitated winning official positions in key unions in those sectors.146  The 
number of factory cells grew to eighty and in September 1933, the PB was informed of ‘a big 
improvement’ in union work; but only 30% of members were engaged in it.147 
 There was no dramatic upturn in 1934.  In April, Campbell reported progress on London 
Transport and the railways.  Success in engineering was arguable while in mining, docks, textiles and 
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among seafarers ‘…we have not advanced since the time of the January resolution’.148  A Comintern 
representative in Britain observed that union work remained the responsibility of a handful of 
functionaries, not the party generally:  ‘That is the main reason why the Party is only slowly and 
hesitatingly carrying out the decisions of the last XII Party Congress’.149  Party membership is an 
unsatisfactory index of union activity; nonetheless it declined from 5,600 in November 1932 to 5000 
in February 1934.150 
 Take-off was related to foreign policy innovation in Moscow and the serendipitous economic 
and industrial revival in Britain, 1935-1938, which combined to create a more amenable climate.  
Social fascism was dropped, pressure on the bureaucracy and winning full-time positions 
rehabilitated, prohibition of the united front lifted.  Political innovation dictated collaboration, 
compromise and conciliation.  The expediential dynamics of trade unionism helped dissipate 
hostility.  Matters should not be magnified. Bevin, Citrine, the TUC general council, and other leaders 
remained intractable.  In a number of unions, notably the Engineers and Miners’, the party achieved 
a degree of influence.  By 1935, the MM and the RTUO had faded away.  By 1937, they had been 
joined by most of the rank and file movements as the CPGB oriented towards the apparatus and the 
unity demanded by the popular front pitch.151 
 The context was crucial.  In January 1932 union membership was declining and continued to 
fall into 1933.  Thereafter it grew from 4.3 million to 6.2 million in 1938.  By that date, 30.5% of 
workers were in unions, compared with 22 % in 1933.  There were 357 strikes in 1933 and 940 in 
1939. Workplace organisation revived in key industries; shop steward numbers increased.  Trends 
were uneven.152  But expanding unions needed organisers and Communists were willing to serve and 
take advantage of a situation more favourable than at any time since the party’s formation.  That 
they grasped their opportunities was related only distantly to events in Moscow in the winter of 
1931.  Like the MM, the RTUO and social fascism, the January resolution was by 1939 an 
anachronism, an occasional reminder of a very different time. 
 
31 
 
 
 
Notes on contributor 
John McIlroy is a Professor of Employment Relations at Middlesex University Business School. He 
was formerly Professor of Industrial Relations at Keele University and Reader in Sociology at The 
University of Manchester.  He co-edited Trade Unions in a Neoliberal World (2010); Histories of 
Labour:  National and International Perspectives (2010); The Struggle for Dignity:  Industrial Politics 
and the 1926 Mining Lockout (2nd ed., 2009); The Post-War Compromise:  British Trade Unions and 
Industrial Politics 1945-64 (2nd ed., 2007); and The High Tide of British Trade Unionism:  Trade Unions 
and Industrial Politics 1964-1979 (2nd ed., 2007). His books include Trade Unions in Britain Today (2nd 
ed., 1995).  His work has appeared in Past and Present, The Journal of Contemporary History, 
International Review of Social History, American Communist History, History Workshop Journal,  
Critique, European Journal of Industrial Relations and the British Journal of Industrial Relations. For 
25 years, he organised classes for trade unionists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
Notes 
 
1
 Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 83. 
2
 Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions, 190.  The Minority Movement (MM) was established by 
the CPGB in 1924 as a broad oppositional body affiliated to RILU.  By 1930 it had subsided into the diminutive 
industrial arm of the party – ibid., passim. 
3
 Carr, Twilight, 213. 
4
 Carr, Foundations of A Planned Economy, Vol 3 and Idem, Twilight remain indispensable guides.  See also, 
McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, 81-119.  
5
 Carr, Twilight, 21. 
6
 Draper, “Ghost of Social-Fascism”, 29-42. 
7
 CPGB, “Immediate Tasks.” 
8
 Pelling, British Communist Party, 71 n3.  Pelling, 69, shared some of the confusion of more recent historians 
over the meaning of ‘independent leadership’ in relation to trade unions, an issue I examine in the next 
section. See also Martin, 170-171.  Martin counterposes work in the reformist unions to independent 
leadership and dates the demise of the latter to the Charter Campaign of 1930-1931 – ibid, 149, 155-156, 162. 
9
 Carr, Twilight, 215.   
10
 Thorpe, British Communist Party, 185. 
11
 Morgan, Harry Pollitt, 77; see also, Worley, Class Against Class, 286. 
12
 Branson, 88-90; Fishman, British Communist Party, 36-40; Thorpe, 183-185; Laybourn and Murphy, Under 
the Red Flag, 70-71. 
13
 Branson, 88; Fishman, 36-40; Thorpe, 185, 193. 
14
 Branson, 91-92; Fishman, 48-61; Thorpe, 197-201. 
15
 McDermott and Agnew, 106. 
16
 Branson, 88. 
17
 Eaden and Renton, Communist Party, 48. 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18
 Fuller, Radical Aristocrats, 104. 
19
 This is the burden of the account of the Third Period in Fishman, 4-82 and it also informs Thorpe, 135-219. 
20
 Carr, Twilight, 8, 20, 23, 48, 209; MacFarlane, British Communist Party, 256-257; Campbell, Scottish Miners, 
334-338; People’s History Museum Manchester, Communist Party Archive (CPA) Reel 25, ECCI Presidium 29 
December 1931 where Pollitt stated:  ‘There are well-defined conditions which the Plenum of the ECCI has laid 
down for the establishment of new unions and when these conditions exist we will endeavour to fulfil those 
tasks’;  CPA, Reel 13, CPGB Political Bureau (PB) 9 January 1932. 
21
 Reel 30, To the Congress of the CPGB 28 November 1929. 
22
 CPGB, Report of the 11
th
 Congress; Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, Moscow (RGASPI) 
495/100/664, J. R. Campbell to CPGB n.d 1930.  
23
 RGASPI 495/100/648, Comintern to CC CPGB 2 January 1930. 
24
 RGASPI 495/100/675, Resolution of the Enlarged Presidium of the ECCI March 1930; CPGB, “Resolution of 
the Central Committee CPGB, March 1930.” 
25
 Reel 28, ECCI Political Secretariat 16 August 1930. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Reel 29, Resolution of Political Secretariat of the ECCI on the Tasks of the CPGB 30 September 1930. 
28
 Reel 24, ECCI Presidium 12 December 1930. 
29
 Reel 12, PB 23 April 1931;  CPGB, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPGB on the 11
th
 Plenum of 
the ECCI”’. 
30
 Reel 30, Political Secretariat ECCI 28 September 1931. 
31
 National Minority Movement, Resolutions of the Fifth World Congress, 108-9. 
32
 In 1930-32 these included Butler; Doris; L; MacGregor; Mills; Rodney; and Tappi – although some of these 
pseudonyms may denote the same agent. 
33
 Reel 12, PB 12 March 9 April 1931; Reel 2, CPGB Central Committee (CC) 30-31 May 1931. 
34
 Daily Worker (DW), 31 March 1930.  Martin, Communism, 151-152. 
35
 See, for example, The Worker, 19 December 1930, January 3, 10, 1931; Glading, “Decisions”.  CC 18 March, 
31 May 1931. 
36
 PB 23 April 1931. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Reel 1, CC 13 September 1930. 
39
 PB 29 January 1931; CC 14 March 1931. 
40
 CC 30 May 1931. 
41
 Ibid; CPGB, “..11th Plenum of the ECCI.” 
42
 CC 19-20 September 1931; CPGB, “Turn to Mass Work.” 
43
 CC 19-20 September 1931. 
44
 PB 8 October 1931. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 CPGB, “Immediate Tasks”, 59-60. 
47
 CPGB activists’ primary loyalty to trade unionism, as opposed to Comintern policy, is a theme of Fishman’s 
work. 
48
 MacFarlane and Martin both contain valuable analytic description of union work and provide a good starting 
point. 
49
 CC 14 March 1931; PB 4 June 1931. 
50
 Pollitt, “Our Party”, 187-195. DW, 26 September 1932. 
51
 PB 17 September 1931. 
52
 PB 4 June 1931. 
53
 Carr, Twilight, 208; PB 9 January 1932. 
54
 CC 31 May 1931. 
55
 McIlroy and Campbell, “Heresy of Arthur Horner”; PB 6 March, 14 May 1931. 
56
 See Martin,162-166. ‘…not only is the Party isolated from the masses but the leadership is isolated from the 
members.’ -  PB 14 January 1932. PB 17 September, 8 October 1931; CC 31 May, 19-20 September 1931. 
57
 PB 29 January 1931. 
58
 CC 30 May 1931. 
59
 CC 18 March, 30 May 1931. 
60
 Martin, 150-151. 
61
 Quoted ibid, 109. 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
62
 The Worker, 18 October 1929.  
63
 CC 14 March, 31 May 1931. 
64
 CC 14 March 1931; PB 17 December 1931; DW 3 October 1932. 
65
 Trotsky, “’The Third Period”, 27-68. 
66
 McIlroy and Campbell, “’For A Revolutionary Workers’ Government’”, 552-3.  PB 30 April 1931; CC 19-20 
September 1931. 
67
 RGASPI 495/100/731, Holmberg, Factory and Trade Union Work of the CPGB and MM 28.XI.31. 
68
 RGASPI 495/100/737, Letter from Tappi n.d Summer 1931. 
69
 CPGB, “Immediate Tasks”. 
70
 Thorpe, 156, 197. 
71
 Carr, Twilight, 215.  The point is reiterated in McIlroy and Campbell, “For A Revolutionary Workers’ 
Government”, 553 and Worley, 287. 
72
 Reel 13, PB 9 January 1932 Reel 3, CC 16-17 January 1932. PB 9 January 1932. 
73
 Martin, 170-171, quotes from Pollitt’s speech at the RILU meeting.  On p. 171 he refers impersonally to: ‘The 
plan elaborated in Moscow in December 1931…’.  Six pages on, and without attempting to establish any 
causative connection between Pollitt’s RILU speech and the January resolution, Martin makes the isolated 
remark:  ‘…following RILU’s acceptance of Pollitt’s plan…’ 177. 
74
 Mahon, Harry Pollitt, 163.  An earlier version by the veteran Communist, Tom Bell, British Communist Party, 
149-150, mentions ‘a special commission’ but omits all reference to the Comintern, Moscow, RILU and Russia. 
75
 Branson, 30. 
76
 Fishman, 40.  There is no evidence that Pollitt conceived rank and file movements as ‘a tactical trick’ or as 
anything other than a means to revitalise independent leadership. 
77
 Ibid, 40, 46 n38. 
78
 Thorpe, 183-184. 
79
 Ibid, 184. 
80
 Reel 32 B, AAS 2 December 1931. 
81
 Ibid, AAS 20 December 1931. 
82
 Ibid.  The files of AAS staff and specialists contain a draft of the resolution from early December: RGASPI 
495/100/732, Draft Line on the Trade Union Question in England ii/XII/31. 
83
 Reel 25, ECCI Presidium 29 December 1931.  Assigning rapporteur tasks to a national leader identified him 
with responsibility for decisions and might be thought to provide some surety they would be carried out. 
84
 ECCI Presidium 29 December 1931; PB 9 January 1932. Pollitt stressed their leading role:  ‘Kuusinen put in a 
report to the Commission…The two big speeches were the speeches of comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky…the 
work of this Commission has been extraordinarily helpful, very critical, very sharp…I have certainly not 
participated in any discussion myself in which the leading comrades of the International have been so 
concrete, so anxious to really get to grips with the problem’ – ibid. 
85
 AAS 2 December 1931. 
86
 CC 19-20 September 1931, where Pollitt mentioned he and Rust ‘would be sent to Moscow’ in November 
and take draft resolutions.   
87
 Branson, 88-89.  No full record was published. Branson relies, perforce, on the incomplete account in RILU 
Magazine – c.f. Carr, Twilight, 48 n.15. 
88
 PB 9 January 1932.  Pollitt claimed Kuusinen spoke on the same lines as Pollitt was speaking to the PB  and 
that the Communist fraction of RILU disowned Lozovsky’s attacks on him.  Carr, Twilight, 215 n33, interprets 
the absence of Pollitt’s speech from the reports in Internationale Press – Korrespondenz as ‘a sign of 
disapproval’. 
89
 RILU Magazine 2, nos 1-2, 19-251; Carr, Twilight, 48. 
90
 RILU Magazine, 251. In Carr’s estimation, Twilight, 215, ‘The British delegates…were severely mauled.’ 
91
  For example, Lozovsky’s scathing address to the April ECCI Plenum was reprinted in Communist Review 
August, September, October 1931. CC 30 May 1931. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 CC 19-20 September 1931. 
94
 RGASPI 495/100/737, Tappi Letter n.d August 1931. 
95
 CC 14 March 1931; PB 9 April 1931.  The main criticism of RILU came from George Allison – ibid. 
96
 RILU Magazine, 66. 
97
 CC 19-20 September 1931.   
98
 Thorpe, 192. 
34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
99
 Fishman, 49.  
100
 Thorpe, 185. 
101
 Martin, 153-156. 
102
 PB 9 January, 14 March 1932. 
103
 AAS 20 December 1931. 
104
 Fishman, 30-43, 45, n26.  Thorpe, 145, states that despite Pollitt’s advocacy of the new line from early 1928, 
he ‘…was by no means an “ultra-left”…’.  Thorpe justifies this with three pieces of evidence:  in 1928 Pollitt 
opposed a red seamen’s union, was ‘rather unenthusiastic’ about the clothing workers’ breakaway and was 
criticised in 1929 for non-advocacy of independent leadership in a strike – criticism he accepted.  These may 
seem insufficient grounds for setting aside Pollitt’s established role in bringing the ultra-left line to Britain and  
support for it thereafter.  The CPGB leadership’s collective adherence to ultra-leftism is decentred by 
distinctive application of the epithet to specific individuals on unconvincing grounds; for example, Gallacher, 
for ‘premature support’ for a new British miners’ union – which Pollitt shared (161-2, 165),  Arnot, Rust and 
Tapsell for reasons which go unexplained (165);  Ferguson for demanding more election candidates (172);  
Rust and Arnot for a position on Horner which Pollitt shared (178-9).  For a case study see McIlroy and 
Campbell, “Heresy”.  
105
 McIlroy, “Restoring Stalinism”, 606-607. 
106
 Groves, Balham Group, 51-58.  These complaints centred on the role of the MM – see, for example, PB 28 
April 1932. 
107
 PB 14 May, 25 June, 4, 10 October 1932; DW, 29 July 1932. 
108
 DW, 28 October 1932; PB 6 August, 4, 10 October 1932; Pollitt, Road to Victory, 45. 
109
 Branson, 92, 90-91.  Little more was heard of the six months allotted for improving union work - but see the 
summer 1932 visitation of Comintern agent, Richard Krebs, to inspect the CPGB:  Thorpe, 198; Valtin, Out of 
the Night, 285-92, 680-691. 
110
 Fishman, 54-56. 
111
 Thorpe, 194.  There are similar problems with Fishman who describes Pollitt and Campbell as ‘centrists’:  63 
n 32. 
112
 Thorpe, 193, 197, 199. 
113
 Ibid., 200. 
114
 Ibid., 201. 
115
 PB 17 September, 4, 10-11 October 1932.  See also Campbell in DW, 15 September 1932, overlooked in 
these texts. Nothing resembling the statement that he essentially agreed with Pollitt, which Thorpe imputes to 
Campbell, is to be found in the source cited – PB 10-11 October – or the minutes of previous or succeeding 
PBs.  Worley, 294, provides no evidence for his claim that Campbell ‘…sympathised with Pollitt’s general line…’, 
a conclusion entirely at odds with the PB minutes. 
116
 The sole example Thorpe, 192-193, offers of a Pollitt - engineered move to the right – failure to establish a 
new union at Lucas-involved applying existing policy.  That these matters should be decided ‘on their merits’ 
was not, as Thorpe suggests, simply the position of Dutt and Lozovsky – it was also the position of the 
Comintern.  RGASPI 495/100/836, Dutt, A Reply to the Trade Union Discussion. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 DW, 8 September 1932. 
119
 DW,. 26 August 1932. 
120
 RGASPI 495/100/836, Dutt to Pollitt, 17.10.32. 
121
 PB 17 September 1932 (Campbell). 
122
 Ibid. Pollitt was mistaken: no such article appeared on July 20.  The mistake is compounded in Worley, 292-
3, which quotes from the non-existent article.  The quotes come from a relatively innocuous piece by Pollitt – 
DW, 29 July – noting the success of the Members’ Rights campaign and opposing the belief that union leaders 
took no notice of pressure.  The article which caused the furore was in DW, 20 August 1932.  
123
 Dutt, Reply.  PB 17 September 1932 (Rust). 
124
 PB 4 October 1932. 
125
 Dutt, Reply. 
126
 RGASPI 495/100/836, Dutt, The Revolutionary Line and the Trade Union Question 17 September 1932, DW 
19 September 1932. 
127
 McIntyre, A Proletarian Science, 69, 211-218; Hinton and Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution, 64-71; 
McIlroy, “Marxism and the Trade Unions”, 497-526.  Lenin was typically employed “biblically” to legitimise 
agitation in the workplace and reactionary unions – for example, CC 16-17 January 1932 (Pollitt). 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
128
 PB 17 September 4, 10-11 October, 29 October 1932. 
129
 Morgan, 78, asserts, ‘…Pollitt decided to clear the air once and for all.  He did so by means of a calculated 
deviation and provocation…’.  No documentation supports this surmise and it is difficult to see why Pollitt 
believed ‘deviation’ could clear the air.  Predictably, it stimulated opposition, soured the atmosphere and 
achieved little.  For Fishman, 38-41, it is one skirmish in Pollitt and Campbell’s long-term and successful battle 
to change the line towards union pragmatism.  Thorpe’s framework, 192-201, is similar, while emphasising 
Pollitt. 
130
 In Moscow Pollitt had been accused of misinterpreting the line of the RILU council as ‘back to 1924’, back to 
the united front, and pressure politics:  AAS 20 December 1931, PB 9 January 1932. 
131
 DW, 5, 20 October 1932. 
132
 DW, 7 November 1932; RGASPI 495/100/822, CC 9 November 1932, where Pollitt stated the article 
‘…represented the opinions of the majority of members of the PB…’. 
133
 RGASPI/495/100/836, Dutt to Pollitt 13.10.32. 
134
 Ibid., Dutt to Pollitt 17.10.32. 
135
 PB 29 October 1932. 
136
 Ibid; PB 10 October; CP/Ind/Poll/3/5, Dutt to Pollitt 26.9.32; DW 30 September 1932; PB 4 October 1932. 
137
 CPA CP/Cent/Cong/3/01, Resolutions  Adopted by the 12
th
 Congress of the CPGB; Pollitt, Road to Victory, 
45-47, 76-77.  Carr’s conclusion that ‘order was restored’ at the Congress, Twilight, 222, fits the facts far better 
than the illusory victory for Pollitt. 
138
 DW, 8 September 1932. 
139
 PB October 10-11 1932. 
140
 Thorpe, 199, 221 notes 54-56. 
141
 PB 4, 10 October 1932. 
142
 Ibid. Pollitt called the comment ‘an unmitigated lie’ amended to ‘a gross misrepresentation’ after Rust 
noted such personal remarks were not helping discussion.  
143
 DW, 6 October 1932. Kuusinen’s statement that using union democracy to replace bureaucrats should not 
be confused with legalism – DW 10 October – provided a glimmer of flexibility.  The Plenum resolution’s 
condemnation of parties ‘which still in practice oppose the existence of Red Trade Unions and the RTUO…and 
who as a substitute for them support the slogan “Make the leaders fight…”’ – ibid, 17 October 1932 – affirmed 
continuity.  CP/Cent/Cong/03/01, 12
th
 Plenum ECCI, The International Situation and the Tasks of the Sections 
of the Communist International. 
144
 Dutt, Reply. 
145
 Carr, Twilight, 64-155, remains a good introduction to these developments.  See also McDermott and 
Agnew, 120-157. 
146
 Hyman, “Rank and File Movements”, 129-158. 
147
 Reel 13, PB 8 September 1933; Shields, ‘One Year’. 
148
 Reel 6, CC 7 April 1934. 
149
 Reel 15, PB 1934 untitled, unsigned n.d. May 1934? 
150
 Thorpe, Appendix 2. 
151
 Woodhouse and Pearce, Essays, 125-135 and Croucher, Engineers at War, 1-66 are seminal outlines. 
152
 Clegg, History, 430, 1-164, Fraser, History, 177-185. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
References 
Bell, Tom.  The British Communist Party:  A Short History.  London:  Lawrence and Wishart, 1937. 
Branson, Noreen.  History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1927-1941.London:  Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1985. 
Campbell, Alan.  The Scottish Miners, 1874-1939, vol 2 Trade Unions and Politics. Aldershot:  
Ashgate, 2000. 
Carr, E. H. Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, vol 3. London:  MacMillan, 1971, 1978. 
Carr, E. H. The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935. London:  MacMillan, 1982. 
Clegg, Hugh.  A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, vol III, 1934-1951.  Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1994. 
CPGB, Report of the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain. London: CPGB, 1929. 
CPGB, “Resolution of the Central Committee CPGB.”  Communist Review March 1930. 
CPGB “The Turn to Mass Work:  Resolution of the Central Committee.”  Communist Review May 
1931.  
CPGB, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPGB on the 11th Plenum of the ECCI.”  
Communist Review June – July 1931. 
CPGB, “Immediate Tasks Before the Party and the Working Class:  Resolution of the Central 
Committee January 1932.”  Communist Review January – February 1932. 
Croucher, Richard.  Engineers at War, 1939-1945.  London:  Merlin Press, 1982. 
Daily Worker, 31 March 1930; 29 July, 20 August, 8, 15, 26, 30 September, 6, 10, 17, 25 October, 7 
November 1932.  
Draper, Theodore.  “The Ghost of Social-Fascism.”  Commentary no 2 (1969):  29-42. 
Eaden, James and David Renton.  The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920.  Basingstoke:  
Palgrave 2002. 
Fishman, Nina.  The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions, 1933-45.    Aldershot:  Scolar 
Press, 1995. 
Fraser, W. Hamish.  A History of British Trade Unionism 1700-1998.  Basingstoke:  MacMillan, 1999. 
Fuller, Ken.  Radical Aristocrats. London:  Lawrence and Wishart, 1985. 
Glading, Percy. “The Decisions of the 5th Congress of the RILU” Communist Review, May 1931. 
Groves, Reg.  The Balham Group:  How British Trotskyism Began.  London:  Pluto Press, 1974. 
Hinton, James and Richard Hyman.  Trade Unions and Revolution.  The Industrial Politics of the Early 
British Communist Party.  London:  Pluto Press, 1975.  
Hyman, Richard.  “Rank and File Movements and Workplace Organisation 1914-1939.”  In A History 
of Industrial Relations, 1914-1939, edited by Chris Wrigley, 129-158.  Brighton:  Harvester Press, 
1987. 
Laybourn, Keith, and Dylan Murphy.  Under the Red Flag:  A History of Communism in Britain.  
Stroud:  Sutton Publishing, 1999. 
MacFarlane, L. J. The British Communist Party:  Its Origin and Development until 1929.  London:  
MacGibbon and Kee, 1966. 
Mahon, John.  Harry Pollitt:  A Biography.  London:  Lawrence and Wishart, 1976. 
Martin, Roderick.  Communism and the British Trade Unions, 1924-1933.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1969. 
McDermott, Kevin, and Jeremy Agnew.  The Comintern.  Basingstoke:  MacMillan, 1996. 
McIlroy, John.  “Restoring Stalinism to Communist History.”  Critique 41, no. 4 (2013):  599-622. 
McIlroy, John.  “Marxism and the Trade Unions:  The Bureaucracy versus the Rank and File Debate 
Revisited.”  Critique 42, no 4 (2014): 497-526. 
McIlroy, John, and Alan Campbell.  “The Heresy of Arthur Horner.”  Llafur:  Journal of Welsh Labour 
History 8, no. 2 (2001):  105-118. 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
McIlroy, John, and Alan Campbell.  “’For a Revolutionary Workers’ Government’:  Moscow, British 
Communism and Revisionist Interpretations of the Third Period, 1927-34.”  European History 
Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2002):  535-569. 
McIntyre, Stuart.  A Proletarian Science:  Marxism in Britain, 1917-1933.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1980. 
Morgan, Kevin.  Harry Pollitt.  Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1993. 
National Minority Movement.  Resolutions of the Fifth World Congress of the RILU.  London:  NMM, 
1931.   
Pelling, Henry.  The British Communist Party:  A Historical Profile.  London:  A and C Black, 1958. 
Pollitt, Harry.  “Our Party and the Mining Crisis.”  Communist Review  January 1930. 
Pollitt, Harry.  The Road to Victory.  London:  CPGB, 1932. 
Red International of Labour Unions, RILU Magazine 2 no 1 / 2 (1932). 
Shields, Jimmy.  “One Year of the January Resolution.”  Communist Review March 1933. 
The Worker 18 October 1929; 19 December 1930; January 3, 10 1931. 
Thorpe, Andrew.  The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43.  Manchester:  Manchester  
University Press, 2000. 
Trotsky, Leon.  ‘”The Third Period’ of the Comintern’s Errors.’”  In Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1930, 27-
68.  New York:  Pathfinder Press, 1975. 
Valtin, Jan.  Out of the Night.  London:  Fortress Books, 1988 [1941]. 
Woodhouse, Michael and Brian Pearce.  Essays on the History of Communism in Britain.  London:  
New Park, 1975. 
Worley, Matthew.  Class Against Class:  The Communist Party in Britain Between the Wars. London:  
I.B. Tauris, 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
